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Abstract
Health care expenses are one of the largest contributing factors to increased per-
sonnel costs, the fastest-rising component of the Department of Defense’s budget.
This research examines the cost implications of developing a new military treatment
facility in a specified geographical region, in an effort to reduce military health care
spending. Care received at a military treatment facility is referred to as direct care,
while care received in the private sector is referred to as purchased care. This research
leverages existing information on direct and purchased medical care to gain insights
into the workload costs for medical care in a geographical region. This research uses
a Monte Carlo simulation approach to determine the direct and purchased care costs
for general surgery and orthopedic specialties. The method is applied to the Atlanta,
Georgia region and conclude that based on workload measures, it is cheaper in Atlanta
to provide direct care at a new military treatment facility.
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A STUDY OF MILITARY HEALTH CARE COSTS: DIRECT VERSUS
PURCHASED CARE IN A GEOGRAPHICAL REGION
I. Introduction
1.1 Chapter Overview
This chapter introduces the motivation, background, research objectives, method-
ology, and assumptions and limitations in this study. This thesis provides insights
for Air Force Medical Service and Air Force Medical Operations Agency into the
costs of purchased medical care in a geographical area and the potential to reduce
these costs. The goal is to provide this information by developing a Monte Carlo
simulation-based methodology to compare the costs of purchased care with the costs
of providing direct care at a military treatment facility (MTF). Ultimately, the aim
of this research is to utilize the Monte Carlo simulation process to inform decision
makers about potential costs of different forms of care. This information can be used
in the future to determine if a new MTF is necessary, in a specified geographical area,
to reduce medical care costs to the Department of Defense (DoD).
1.2 Motivation
Personnel costs, including military pay and allowances, military health care, civil-
ian pay, and family support, encompass nearly half of the DoD’s budget [1]. Over
the last decade, personnel costs have been the fastest-rising component of the bud-
get, driven to a considerable degree by expenses for health care. The DoD has seen
funding for health care costs grow from 6 percent of the DoD’s base budget in 2000
1
to nearly 10 percent in 2015 [2]. The DoD cannot afford to sustain this rate of growth
for health care compensation.
Much of the increase is attributable to new and expanded TRICARE benefits and
comparatively low out-of-pocket costs for people to use those benefits. Due to this,
the number of users has increased as people switch from more expensive private plans
to TRICARE. Additionally, TRICARE participants have increased the volume of
health services they consume [1].
In a fiscal climate in which the department’s overall budget is constrained, contin-
ued rapid growth in military health care costs could force the DoD to reduce spending
in other areas, such as force structure, military readiness, and weapons modernization
[3]. Therefore, because of these rising costs Air Force Medical Service and Air Force
Medical Operations Agency asked for an analysis of the costs of providing purchased
care in a given geographical area. They are interested in the possibility of reducing
these purchased care costs through the development of a new MTF clinic which will
provide direct care. Ideally, this research process provides a format for determin-
ing the potential costs of delivering direct and purchased care in any geographical
location.
Air Force Medical Service
The mission of Air Force Medical Service is to ensure medically fit forces, provide
expeditionary medics, and improve the health of all they serve to meet our Nation’s
needs [4]. Air Force Medical Service has four main goals that are aligned with the
Military Health System’s quadruple aim: increased readiness, better care, better
health, and best value. Under readiness, Air Force Medical Service strives to maintain
medically ready Airmen, ensure well-trained, well-equipped, and current medics, and
support the full spectrum of military operations. The goal of better care consists of
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providing safe care, delivering quality care, and promoting positive patient experiences
and outcomes. Better health focuses on encouraging healthy behavior, enhancing
resiliency and human performance, and reducing illness and injury. Finally, best
value looks at providing quality care at the lowest cost.
Air Force Medical Service had a Fiscal Year 2017 budget of 6.16 billion dollars [4].
Air Force Medical Service’s annual funding for military health care can be divided
into two major categories: The Defense Health Program and military personnel. The
defense appropriation act provides funding to the Defense Health Program for health-
related operations and maintenance, other procurement, and research, development,
test and evaluation. In the same appropriation act, under the military personnel
section, funding for military personnel and the Medicare-Eligible Retiree Health Care
Fund are included. Additional funds exist for military construction and overseas
contingency operations.
Air Force Medical Operations Agency
Air Force Medical Operations Agency is firmly aligned with the Air Force Med-
ical Service’s strategy. The mission of Air Force Medical Operations Agency is to
lead change for better care and mission support through policy execution across the
Air Force Medical Service [5]. Air Force Medical Operations Agency serves the Mili-
tary Health System, the Air Force Surgeon General, Major Command Surgeons, and
Military Treatment Facility Commanders. For these customers, Air Force Medical
Operations Agency participates in Defense Health Agency working groups, provides
expertise for policy development and precise application of resources to requirements,
consults on health care resourcing and operations issues, and coordinates the best
processes, data analysis, and clinical expertise for efficient patient-centered health
care [5]. Air Force Medical Operations Agency supports health care operations and
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execution by enabling world-class medical logistics throughout the Air Force Medical
Service.
1.3 Background
The Military Health System is a federated health care system responsible for pro-
viding health support for the full range of military operations (the “medical readiness
mission”) and for delivering safe, high-quality care for uniformed service members
(both Active Duty and Reserve), retirees, survivors, and family members [6]. The
Military Health System is responsible for both medical readiness of the force and the
TRICARE program.
TRICARE
The TRICARE program is an integrated system of military health care providers
and regional networks of civilian providers. In Fiscal Year 1994, Congress enacted
law to establish the DoD health care benefit referred to as TRICARE. TRICARE
was named for the initial three levels of coverage that it offered: TRICARE Prime,
Standard, and Extra. Over the past few years, additional TRICARE health plan
options have been developed. The current list of TRICARE plans include Prime,
Prime Remote, Prime Overseas, Prime Remote Overseas, Select, Select Overseas, For
Life, Reserve Select, Retired Reserve, Young Adult, and US Family Health Plan [7].
All TRICARE plans meet or exceed the requirements for minimum essential coverage
under the Affordable Care Act.
TRICARE provides coverage to almost 9.5 million beneficiaries worldwide. The
following groups of people are eligible to participate in TRICARE:
• All members of the four military branches as well as members of the Coast
Guard and the commissioned corps of the Public Health Service and of the
4
National Oceanic Atmospheric Administration
• Families of current service members
• Retired service members and their families
Ultimately, plan availability depends on who the beneficiary is and where he/she lives.
TRICARE Prime
TRICARE Prime includes Prime, Prime Remote, Prime Overseas, and Prime
Overseas Remote. Approximately 4.6 million beneficiaries are enrolled in the TRI-
CARE Prime option [8]. Enrollees include active duty service members and their
families, activated guard/reserve members and their families, retired service mem-
bers and their families, and survivors. This plan is a managed care option similar
to that provided by the health maintenance organization [7]. Individuals enrolled in
TRICARE Prime are assigned to a primary care manager which is usually located at
the closest MTF. In order to receive specialty care, enrollees must first be referred by
their Primary Care Manager.
Under this plan there is no enrollment fee or cost-sharing deductible for active
duty members and their families. There is an annual enrollment fee for retirees and
family members not yet eligible for Medicare.
TRICARE Select
TRICARE Select, a new option which replaces TRICARE Standard and Extra, is a
fee-for-service option that requires beneficiaries to enroll in order to participate. Those
enrolled in TRICARE Select constitute 1.94 million of the TRICARE beneficiaries
[7]. These plans include active duty family members, activated guard/reserve family
members, retired service members and their families, and survivors.
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Participants of the Select plan pay higher out-of-pocket costs to have greater free-
dom to select providers and to access care. Referrals are not required, but one may
need prior authorization from the regional contractor for some services under the
Select plan [7]. Beneficiaries of this plan must pay an annual outpatient deductible
and any difference between a provider’s billed charges and the rate of reimbursement
allowed under the plan.
TRICARE For Life
TRICARE For Life is a Medicare wraparound program for military retirees who
have Medicare Part A and B; it covers the remaining cost of care after Medicare has
paid its share. Coverage under this plan is automatic if the beneficiary has Medicare
Part A and B. Enrollment in the plan is not required, but the beneficiary must pay
Medicare Part B premiums.
Direct Care versus Purchased Care
TRICARE provides care to its eligible beneficiaries in two broad settings: a sys-
tem of DoD hospitals, clinics, and pharmacies (usually MTFs); and a supplemental
network of participating civilian health care professionals, institutions, pharmacies,
and suppliers [8]. The former is known as direct care, while the later is referred to as
purchased care.
The Military Health System combines health care resources from both direct and
purchased care components to provide access to high-quality health care, while main-
taining the capability to support military operations worldwide. The Military Health
System purchases more than 65 percent of the total care provided to beneficiaries
through tailored contracts [2]. Currently, the DoD purchases care from the private
sector because the direct care system does not have the capacity to meet the benefi-
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ciary care demand, and the MTFs may sometimes lack the equipment and/or sufficient
personnel with the requisite skills to perform certain procedures.
For our analysis, we use estimated resource and staff workload to determine the
costs associated with both direct and purchased care. To compare the costs of provid-
ing direct and purchased inpatient care, we use Relative Weighted Products (RWPs)
for non-mental health Diagnosis-Related Groups and bed days when no RWP value
exists [3]. To calculate the value of outpatient care we use Relative Value Units
(RVUs) and Ambulatory Payment Classification (APC) weights [3].
History of Health Care Reform
The DoD has submitted numerous reform plans since 2005, largely to control
health care costs [1]. Commencing in Fiscal Year 2012, the DoD initiated a series
of efforts to reduce the cost of doing business by identifying opportunities to better
allocate resources in health care as well as other focus areas. In the Fiscal Year 2015
budget the effort was revived to control the rising health care costs. The Fiscal Year
2017 proposal included more emphasis on MTFs as the lowest cost option for care to
make full use of capacity and provide needed readiness training workload for military
providers [1]. Even with all these plans and proposals, the Fiscal Year 2018 budget
request includes $51 billion to support the Military Health System [2]. We need to
take steps to balance the rate of growth in health care costs. One small step to do this
is to examine the amount the DoD pays for out-of-network health care and explore
the possibility of reducing the amount they pay by providing care inside their network
of MTFs.
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1.4 Objective
The predominant objective of this thesis is to gain insight into the cost of pur-
chased medical care in a geographical region and determine if there is a need for the
development of a new MTF in order to reduce health care costs to the DoD. This
objective is comprised of sub-objectives. The main research questions of interest for
this thesis are:
1. Is there enough demand in the area to outweigh the costs of developing a new
MTF?
2. Do the costs for care follow any underlying distributions?
3. How do the current purchased care costs compare to the potential costs of
providing direct care at an MTF?
4. How does the health care delivery method affect medical and operational readi-
ness?
The analysis in this thesis focuses on the Atlanta, Georgia region, specifically
general surgery and orthopedic specialty care services. The research questions are
addressed using the following process:
• Identify a 60 minute specialty care drive time radius around Atlanta, Georgia;
• Determine the zip codes encompassed in the radius;
• Capture the eligible enrollment data by zip code in the drive time radius;
• Determine the potential enrollment for the new MTF based on TRICARE ben-
eficiary categories;
• Capture the current value of purchased care for the specialties in the radius;
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• Identify the behavior of cost types based on known distributions;
• Simulate the costs of different types of care based on workload measures;
• Use the projected enrollment and simulated costs of care to estimate the costs
of direct and purchased care in the area;
• Compare the potential performance of the MTF in Atlanta, Georgia with similar
sized operational MTFs; and
• Characterize questions for future research.
1.5 Methodology
This research leverages existing information on direct and purchased medical care
in a geographical area to gain insight into the potential need for a new MTF. A
first step is to estimate the distributions of different care types. Then a Monte
Carlo simulation approach helps determine the different direct and purchased care
cost margins by care type. From the Monte Carlo simulation, the workload costs of
providing direct and purchased care based on two enrollment scenarios are compared.
The first scenario, labeled Wright Patterson Air Force Base enrollment, calculates the
workload costs for the observed number of encounters experienced at Wright Patterson
Air Force Base. The second scenario, labeled Atlanta enrollment, uses the current
enrollment numbers in the Atlanta region to predict the number of encounters. The
predicted number of encounters is then used to calculate the workload costs for direct
and purchased care. For this thesis, the overarching objective is to minimize health
care costs in the region while also maintaining medical and operational readiness. To
achieve this objective, two potential alternatives are considered:
1. Do nothing and continue to purchase care in the area; or
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2. Develop a new MTF in the area.
The work starts with a large amount of data exported from Air Force Medical
Service Analytics’ CAPE-RS system. The existing data helps determine the feasibility
of meeting the readiness component and focus the research on adequately modeling
the workload costs for direct and purchased care in the region. The performance of the
model is measured in terms of dollars saved. Sensitivity analysis on key parameters
in the model helps predict the costs of providing direct care at a MTF and determine
the break-even point between the two scenarios.
1.6 Assumptions and Limitations
There are many geographical areas that have high values of purchased care, but
to identify and analyze all these regions would require extensive effort and time be-
yond the capacity of this research. Therefore, this research limits the scope to the
Atlanta, Georgia geographical area. Additionally, sponsors indicated specific interest
in the general surgery and orthopedics specialties. So only these two specialties are
considered in regards to MTF development and costs of care. The model can expand
to analyze additional services at a later time. This research helps illustrate the po-
tential process by which decisions about MTF development are made. Assumptions
and limitations applied to the model include the following:
• The process is performed as planned;
• The necessary budget exists to execute any strategy;
• Any recommendations can be implemented immediately;
• The costs are represented in 2018 dollars;
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• The potential MTF clinic address will be located at the address of the existing
VA hospital in Atlanta, Georgia;
• The number of beneficiaries will stay relatively constant, with no dramatic
increase or decrease in beneficiary numbers in any category;
• The costs the provide health care will stay relatively constant;
• Neither policy makers nor the DoD will institute new benefits that will expand
the eligible TRICARE population or the cost of the program;
• No consideration is given to activities related to research, development, test and
evaluation, other procurement, or military construction;
• Startup costs are not estimated;
• Funding allocated directly to the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force
for providing medical care is excluded;
• The TRICARE structure as of January 1, 2018 is used for this analysis;
• The results of this analysis do not extrapolate to every geographical area; and
• Other health insurance is not considered when determining potential cost sav-
ings.
1.7 Thesis Outline
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides a literature
review on the past efforts to reduce military health care costs and the different facets
of a MTF. Chapter 3 presents the methodologies and model formulation applied to
this research. Chapter 4 presents the results and analysis of our model. Chapter
11
5 summarizes the contributions of this research and proposes directions for further
studies.
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II. Literature Review
2.1 Overview
This literature review focuses on addressing different facets of military health care
and appropriate strategies to improve them. This chapter begins by reviewing pre-
vious approaches to reduce spending on military health care and change the military
health care design and delivery system. The costs of providing care at military treat-
ment facilities (MTFs) and private sector facilities are reviewed. An understanding of
these areas of study along with the relevance of the health care system to the United
States Air Force is crucial to explain the importance of our model. Following a review
of the cost-focused areas, recent literature is discussed covering the performance of
MTFs and the importance of Air Force Medical Service readiness.
2.2 Spending on Military Health Care
The rapid growth in military health care spending is encroaching on Department of
Defense (DoD) funds available for readiness and modernization requirements. There-
fore, there is growing interest in examining the costs of the military health care system
and approaches to reduce those costs. The Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) ex-
amined the Unified Medical Program, which consists of all appropriations that fund
the Military Health System. IDA highlights the trends in recent Unified Medical Pro-
gram funding. There was a temporary decrease in Fiscal Year 2013, but this drop has
not altered the increasing trends in the three largest expenditure categories; direct
care, purchased care, and military personnel [8]. In addition, total Unified Medical
Program funds continue to increase annually, reaching an estimated $52.55 billion in
Fiscal Year 2017 [9].
According to a study conducted by the United States Congressional Budget Office
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(CBO) in 2014, causes for medical care cost growth include the new and expanded
TRICARE benefits, increased utilization fostered by financial incentives to use TRI-
CARE, and medical costs of recent wars [10]. CBO found the first two factors to
explain most of the growth in military health care cost since 2000 [10]. By contrast
the third factor has a comparatively small effect on the DoD’s spending [9].
Policy makers have considered various initiatives to slow the rate of growth for
health care spending in general. CBO and IDA examined the following approaches:
better managing chronic diseases, more effectively administering the military health
care system, increasing cost sharing for retirees who use TRICARE, and restructuring
the TRICARE program [10].
Better Management of Chronic Diseases
Previous studies examined the first program instituted by TRICARE to manage
treatment of three chronic conditions: asthma, congestive heart failure, and diabetes
[11]. It was found that TRICARE beneficiaries with those diseases incurred lower
medical costs than the control group. However, the program yielded a net savings of
only $5.8 million [12]. CBO’s analysis further supports this research as they conclude
TRICARE’s disease management programs do not produce substantial savings. CBO
estimates that savings would be less than $46 million per year, only 0.1 percent of
total TRICARE costs for 2014, for the entire population to participate in disease
management programs [10].
Administer the Military Health Care System More Effectively
The DoD could reduce health care spending by altering its operations without
affecting patients directly. CBO explored two approaches: educate military physi-
cians in a less costly way and hire additional auditors [10]. Previous research has
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indicated that a student at the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences,
the DoD’s medical school, costs three times as much as a comparable student using
the scholarship program [13]. CBO estimates closing the Uniformed Services Univer-
sity of the Health Sciences and funding additional scholarships for physicians would
reduce spending by as much as $150 million per year and would have a relatively
small effect on the DoD’s overall budget [10]. Meanwhile, hiring additional auditors
to reduce fraud, waste, and abuse in federal health care programs would result in an
even smaller fraction of savings. CBO projected that doubling the number of auditors
would increase spending by about $1.3 million per year for an estimated reduction of
only $2 million per year [10].
Increased Cost Sharing
CBO investigated three specific options that would institute changes to TRI-
CARE’s current health care cost sharing structure. The first option increases medical
cost sharing for beneficiaries who have already retired from the military but who are
not yet eligible for Medicare [10]. Option two is to make working-age retirees and their
families ineligible for TRICARE prime, but allow them to continue using other TRI-
CARE plans after paying an annual fee [10]. Lastly, option three introduces minimum
out-of-pocket requirements for Medicare-eligible retirees and their family members to
access TRICARE for Life [10]. The predicted net reduction in the federal deficit
would be $18 billion for option one, $60 billion for option two, and $31 billion for
option three over the 10-year period spanning from 2014 to 2023 [10]. The estimated
spending reductions realized by implementing these options would not necessarily be
additive. However, options one or two could be combined with option three.
CBO conducted a follow-up effort to examine an option to increase cost sharing for
most beneficiaries who use TRICARE, not just retirees. CBO found that this option
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would primarily affect the demand of health care as savings would accrue straight to
the government because beneficiaries would use fewer health care services and switch
to cheaper TRICARE plans or to other sources of health insurance. This option could
save a net of $2.5 billion a year [14].
Restructure the TRICARE Program
The TRICARE program constantly undergoes changes aimed at increasing bene-
ficiary health care choices, improving access to care, and simplifying cost shares. The
most recent changes to the TRICARE program went into effect on January 1, 2018.
Under the new program, regions in the United States were consolidated from three
regions down to two. Two new contractors, Humana Military and Health Net Fed-
eral Services, administer to these regions at a total cost close to $60 billion over five
years [15]. This creates a simpler and streamlined process for both the administrator
and user. These actions are projected to reduce costs, though the magnitude of cost
reduction is currently uncertain. The TRICARE program has faced additional re-
structuring with both the Standard and Extra plans being replaced by the new Select
plan both stateside and overseas. With the new plan comes additional preventative
care services aimed at reducing the need for managed care of chronic conditions. Ad-
ditionally, many cost shares were replaced with fixed amount copays under the new
program [16]. However, literature on the realized resultant improvements for changes
in the TRICARE program is non-existent due to the recency of the updates.
As part of restructuring the design and delivery of the military health care benefit,
IDA estimated the steady-state cost of providing health care to a portion of DoD
beneficiaries through a premium-based insurance model consistent with an employer-
sponsored benefit program offering numerous private health plan options [8]. Under
this model proposed by the Military Compensation and Retirement Modernization
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Commission, IDA estimated a potential budgetary savings of $3.2 billion once the
model is fully implemented and a savings as high as $7.5 billion if beneficiaries enroll
in lower cost private insurance plans [8].
In 2017, CBO analyzed a specific option to replace TRICARE with a choice of
commercial insurance plans for most beneficiaries. Based on reforms proposed by
the Military Compensation and Retirement Modernization Commission, the option
would offer commercial insurance and incorporate MTFs into those networks [14].
This approach is attractive as it would change both the supply and demand side
of the market by substantially restructuring the TRICARE benefit and its delivery
system, including adding new cash allowances for families of active duty members and
raising out-of-pocket costs for working age retirees [14]. CBO examined the effects
when the policy changes are fully implemented, concluding there would be an increase
of $700 million annually on the funding deficit.
2.3 Cost Comparison of Military and Private Sector Care
The DoD periodically conducts analyses to examine ways of improving the overall
efficiency and effectiveness of its health care system. Care received at MTFs (direct
care) cost an estimated $17.73 billion in 2017, consuming the largest share of the
DoD’s health care funding [9]. The number of health care providers in the military
and the capacity of MTFs have remained essentially fixed while increases in the
demand for health care have grown, leading to the growing use of, and increased
costs for, purchased care. Purchased care accounted for the second largest portion of
health care funding with costs estimated to be $15.74 billion in 2017 [9].
One approach for improved health care delivery that receives a great deal of at-
tention is to evaluate whether it is more cost-effective to provide care at MTFs or
purchase the care from the private sector. The cost difference between direct and
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purchased care is uncertain. If MTFs can provide care less expensively than TRI-
CARE contractors, policies that encourage greater use of those facilities would not
only improve the operational readiness but also reduce the overall cost of care [14].
If the opposite were true, the DoD could potentially reduce the size of the direct care
network without compromising readiness, outsource more care to the private sector,
and thereby reduce spending [14].
An initial study was conducted by IDA in 1994 to examine the “make versus buy”
decision strategy for military health care [17]. As the military medical care program
grew, a follow-up study was conducted by the Center for Naval Analysis in 2003.
The Center for Naval Analysis study compared the costs of direct and purchased
care [18]. Both analyses concluded that in general it was less expensive for the DoD
to provide direct care. Meanwhile, the TRICARE Management Activity conducted
a similar study where they concluded the opposite to be true; purchased care was
generally less expensive to the DoD [19]. The conflicting results are a consequence of
differing perspectives and data sources. Results varied depending on how the costs
were measured. IDA and the Center for Naval Analysis focused their calculations on
the total cost to provide a given level of services, whereas the TRICARE Management
Activity considered cost only to the DoD [9].
In 2016, as more detailed and complete data on workload and costs became avail-
able, IDA performed research to estimate the relative costs of the MTF and private
sector workload. The research compared the actual cost of producing care at a given
MTF with an estimate of what that same care would have cost if priced at pri-
vate sector rates [9]. For inpatient workload, IDA used Relative Weighted Products
(RWPs) for non-mental health Diagnosis-Related Groups and bed days for mental
health Diagnosis-Related Groups. IDA concluded that the costs of providing inpa-
tient direct care at the 41 domestic MTFs would have been 34 percent lower had the
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care been purchased in the private sector, and 49 percent lower if only the costs to the
DoD is considered [9]. For inpatient care by Major Diagnostic Category, IDA found
direct care is 61 percent more costly than the same purchased care (68 percent if only
the cost to DoD is considered) [9]. The IDA study examined outpatient costs using
two measures of workload: Relative Value Units (RVUs) and Ambulatory Payment
Classification (APC) weights for facility procedures [9]. Results of their MTF outpa-
tient workload analysis indicate cost would have been 35 percent lower in the private
sector (43 percent lower if only cost to DoD is considered) [9]. The Major Diagnostic
Category outpatient analysis yields similar results as costs would be 39 percent lower
for purchased care [9].
The results of the 2016 IDA study indicated that in the long run it is cheaper
to provide inpatient and outpatient care through purchased care at private sector
rates. This research focused on the costs of delivering the TRICARE benefit as it
was constituted at the time. Since this work, however, the TRICARE benefit has
evolved and the costs of health care have increased, so it is unknown whether the
results are still accurate. There is no discussion of how the change from MTF to
private sector care would effect the access, choice, and value of care for beneficiaries.
Additionally, the study does not consider the ready medical force mission and the
need to train and keep our doctors current.
In a MHS modernization study, the DoD acknowledged that the average cost of
medical care provided to TRICARE beneficiaries in the direct care system is usually
higher than the cost of purchased care [20]. However, the study noted that MTF
buildings and equipment represent sunk costs. Additionally, because the number
of military personnel is determined by readiness needs, the authors concluded that
the costs of operational uniformed personnel are fixed [20]. The study recommends
that the direct care system be filled to capacity first before excess care beyond that
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capacity is sent to civilian providers [14].
2.4 Relevant to the Air Force
The United States Air Force knows that taking care of their people helps ensure
mission success. As a part of this, the Air Force provides Airmen and their families
with attractive health insurance plans. Service members, retirees, and their families
receive excellent rates and low cost, comprehensive medical and dental care at military
or civilian facilities. These benefits to join ensure an all-volunteer force while helping
improve the service member and their family’s quality of life. Therefore, changing
the way the TRICARE system is designed or delivered could affect the behavior of
current TRICARE beneficiaries and potentially affect the United States Air Force’s
mission. Options to reduce federal health care spending by increasing the user out-
of-pocket cost could discourage some people from using health care services. Higher
costs could cause some patients to delay seeking care, causing adverse health outcomes
and affecting personnel readiness.
Active Duty and Their Family
In 2012, the DoD estimated that a family enrolled in TRICARE prime would pay
about one-sixth of what a similar family would pay for coverage in a civilian Health
Maintenance Organization [21]. Even though active duty service members represent
a relatively small portion of all TRICARE beneficiaries and tend to use the system
less than other groups, they and their families should receive easy and low-cost access
to health care [10]. This price is relevant for the Air Force so that family health
issues and related financial burdens do not weigh on the minds of service members,
especially those deployed overseas.
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Retirees and Their Family
The current health insurance system favors only a small fraction of Air Force
members because most people who join the Air Force do not serve an entire career
and will never qualify for retiree medical care through TRICARE [10]. Still, it is
important to consider this subset of the population when developing approaches to
reduce health care spending. Some approaches consider increasing the cost-sharing
burden on the retired user. However, some current Air Force retirees argue that
they initially joined and remained in the Air Force for their entire careers with the
understanding that they would receive medical care for free or at a very low cost after
retiring [10]. Significantly limiting TRICARE coverage for military retirees and their
dependents could be considered unfair as it would impose an unexpected financial cost
on many of those beneficiaries and could adversely affect military retention [10]. The
anticipation of low out-of-pocket costs in the future may encourage older members to
remain for an entire career, and the experience those longer serving members provide
would benefit the Air Force [10].
2.5 Performance of Military Treatment Facilities
The Patient Centered Medical Home operations focus on delivering the “high-
est quality, evidence-based, patient-centered care to enrolled patients through team-
oriented processes, enhanced access, improved provider continuity, superior commu-
nications and coordinated prevention, education, and management of patients” [22].
The Patient Centered Medical Home operations will provide operational health and
readiness for all military members and promote clinical currency for the members of
the team for optimal MTF performance [22]. It is pertinent for MTFs to perform
at optimal levels in order to reduce health care costs, ensure medical readiness, and
treat the most patients.
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A 2011 RAND article, considered efforts to assess the performance of MTFs in cost-
effectively managing health care under the DoD’s TRICARE program [23]. The study
conducted a qualitative review of the performance assessment in health care. The
results indicate that systematic factors such as the TRICARE benefit, deployments
of medical and other personnel, and the health status and typical health care needs
of MTF enrollees affect MTF utilization and cost performance measures [23]. RAND
also concluded that the performance of health care managers is a factor affecting
overall MTF performance. MTF leaders influence the amount and efficiency of care
provided based on the policies set in place by the leader [23]. The effectiveness of
performance assessments for MTFs is generally greater for larger facilities. Still,
RAND suggests alternatives such as more targeted but complex assessments which
could help to diagnose MTF performance problems more reliably and methods to
treat them more effectively [23].
To help improve MTF performance, the DoD has considered setting goals for
health care utilization in MTFs and rewarding or penalizing MTFs according to their
performance [23]. This initiative assumes that MTF leaders are able to cost-effectively
manage care, just as physicians do in the private sector. This would be particularly
advantageous in areas in which TRICARE costs are high at private hospitals. In
that case MTF leaders could improve their performance assessments by encouraging
beneficiaries to be treated at military hospitals with spare capacity [23].
After the RAND study, the DoD’s researchers conducted an internal study of the
performance of the direct care system. A study released in 2014, reviewed the effi-
ciency of MTFs [24]. The researchers found that overall access, quality, and safety of
MTFs were appropriate, but on the individual level MTF performance varied widely.
Surgical complications were statistically more frequent than expected in almost half
of the MTFs that voluntarily reported data on the incidence of disease and mortality
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[24]. Analysis showed that there were persistent problems in three MTFs even though
three others were performing at the top tier nationally [24]. The differences may be
due to the systematic factors identified in the RAND study.
2.6 Air Force Medical Service Readiness
The Military Health System aims to ensure that service members are healthy
enough to deploy and that military clinicians are adequately trained to care for per-
sonnel during both peacetime and wartime [14]. The former is often referred to as
medical readiness, while the latter is known as operational readiness. MTFs play
a pertinent role in guaranteeing that personnel are ready for combat. The Military
Health System is highly efficient and effective for ensuring medical readiness, as all
military personnel are screened at MTFs before they deploy overseas and again when
they return home. However, achieving operational readiness is a much more difficult
task. This is due to the breath of requirements and uncertainty surrounding methods
to ensure medical professionals and MTFs can sufficiently meet demand at home and
in the deployed environment.
Operational Readiness
The DoD pursues its operational readiness goals by maintaining its own system
of clinics and hospitals and by training its own uniformed clinicians. Thus, the DoD
is responsible for certifying that its MTFs run efficiently. As a part of the global
war on terror, the medical departments of the three military services support combat
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Specialty care physicians, specifically surgeons,
operating room nurses, and technicians, are in high demand. Deployments of these
highly trained specialists due to the in-theater staffing requirements present Air Force
Medical Service with the MTF efficiency problem of determining how to provide for
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the home-station health care needs these specialists would normally provide were they
not deployed [25].
A benefit of the DoD running its own network of treatment facilities is that they
can ensure health care providers are adequately trained with enough frequency to
ensure competence. The primary means by which military medical personnel develop
and maintain their skills is by providing care at MTFs to TRICARE beneficiaries [14].
Specialty care teams must operate on patients with a wide variety of health needs
in order to stay ready for wartime and maintain their surgical skills in peacetime
[25]. However, there are questions as to whether military providers can deliver high-
quality care in the combat setting because the variety of cases that these providers
encounter during peacetime do not normally match the types typically seen in combat.
The general medicine practiced in most MTFs means there is little specialization,
which potentially adversely affects the outcomes of complex medical procedures and
surgeries required in combat settings [14]. However, regular surgery helps to provide
specialty care teams with the surgical experience necessary to maintain their technical
proficiency, which will be necessary for treating severe wounds and injuries in a combat
setting [25].
Methods to Improve Operational Readiness
RAND suggests that in order to maintain a staff of critical-care specialists ready
for deployment, Air Force Medical Service may need to increase its inpatient work-
load at MTFs or find alternatives for training critical-care specialists at hospitals
not run by the military [25]. In their report, RAND mentions training alternatives,
which could include assignments to other services’ hospitals, partnerships with Vet-
erans Affairs or civilian hospitals, or greater use of the Air National Guard or Air
Force Reserve medical personnel in wartime [25]. Additionally, Air Force Medical
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Service must recruit, train, and retain a highly skilled medical force because graduate
medical education and military-unique specialized training are critical to supporting
operational readiness [25]. RAND suggests this can be accomplished by providing
professional opportunities that help attract high-quality medical personnel.
CBO considered an approach aimed to identify the costs of ensuring operational
readiness. A better understanding of the cost of providing health care and the costs
of activities needed to ensure readiness could help decision makers develop more
efficient ways of meeting the readiness goal. If the military medical establishment
is too large for wartime missions and providers see too few patients to maintain
their proficiency, the DoD may be paying more than necessary for readiness [14].
Currently, the DoD allocates funding to different portions of the Military Health
System in a manner that makes it difficult to track the cost of ensuring operational
readiness [14]. Military physicians receive their salaries through the military personnel
appropriation, while individual hospitals receive an overall budget for their supplies,
materials, and equipment through the operations and maintenance appropriation.
More transparency of the costs of providing operational readiness could help DoD
operate the Military Health System more efficiently [14].
2.7 Summary
The aforementioned works emphasize the rising health care costs to the DoD and
describe previously formulated approaches to decrease these costs. Many sources
recommend increased cost-sharing for TRICARE beneficiaries as it would decrease
costs to the DoD by the greatest magnitude. In reviewing the cost comparisons
between producing medical care at MTF or purchasing the same care from the private
sector, there remains no agreement as to whether direct or purchased care is more
economical. this research will address this problem for the Atlanta, Georgia region.
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Providing the health care benefit is relevant to Air Force personnel sustainability.
However, drastic changes in the TRICARE program that increase cost to the user
could potentially negatively impact retention rates.
Variations of some of the approaches previously mentioned in this literature review
have been implemented. Many of these past efforts have focused on military health
care spending as a whole. However, these approaches are costly for the health care
user, difficult to implement, and/or infeasible due to operational and medical readi-
ness requirements. Little research has been completed to examine the minute levels.
This is due to the believed small cost savings that would result. Thus, this research
is important because it can be applied on a large scale for cities where an increasing
trend in purchased care or enrollment exists.
There is a need for a new approach for reducing military health care costs to the
DoD. This research focuses on determining whether the current amount of purchased
care in a geographical area reaches a benchmark level to ensure the medical and
operational readiness of the force and justify the costs of providing the same care
in-house. The new methodology is presented in the next chapter.
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III. Methodology
3.1 Overview
This chapter outlines the approach to analyzing the different types of military
medical care with respect to constraints and capabilities on the care workload. The
data provided by Air Force Medical Operations Agency is described along with the
process of cleaning the data and how the data is utilized. The simulation used to
perform the research is then described, followed by a description of the model created
to increase the tractability of the analysis. Lastly, is a discussion of utilizing Monte
Carlo simulations to bolster the significance of the findings as well as the approach
to verify and validate the model.
3.2 Data
The focus of the research is on specialty medical care, namely general surgery
and orthopedics, provided in and around Atlanta, Georgia. Access to care standards
indicate that specialty care should be provided within a 60 minute drive time for the
patient. Therefore, to find the demand for general surgery and orthopedic care in
the specified geographical area it was necessary to first identify a 60 minute specialty
care drive time radius around Atlanta, Georgia with traffic considered. This involved
the haversine formula in conjunction with R software code. The haversine formula is
an equation used to approximate distance, giving great-circle distances between two
points on a sphere from their longitudes and latitudes. The haversine formula is
hav(θ) = sin2
(
θ
2
)
=
1− cos(θ)
2
. (1)
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Microsoft Office Excel Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) code implemented the
haversine formula and was used to find all zip codes located within 100 miles of the
origin. In this research, the θ represents a central angle anchored at the origin. The
origin is the current Decatur VA hospital located at 1670 Clairmont Rd, Decatur,
GA 30033. The VBA haversine code returned 743 unique zip codes. However, not
all of these zip codes are within a 60 minute drive time radius of Atlanta. R software
called Google to geocode an address and create a 60 minute drive time isoline with
traffic enabled around the origin. This radius is illustrated in Figure 1.
Figure 1. 60 Minutes Drive Time Radius for Atlanta, Georgia
The next step was to determine the zip codes encompassed in the radius depicted
in Figure 1. The output from the R code consisted of the longitudes and latitudes
of the points along the isoline. To obtain the zip codes in the radius, the given
longitudes and latitudes were reverse geocoded into a readable address. This process
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only gave the zip codes along the isoline. The initial list of 743 zip codes produced
from the haversine formula were used to restrict the zip code set to those captured
inside and along the isoline. This resultant zip code list consisted of 297 zip codes
within a 60 minute drive time of the origin. It is important to determine the zip
codes encompassed in this area because the available enrollment data is based on the
zip code the beneficiary resides in. This zip code is then used to determine what
military treatment facility (MTF), if any, the beneficiary is assigned to. If there is
no assigned MTF, as is the case with most of the Atlanta-based zip codes, then the
care is purchased.
TRICARE enrollment and purchased inpatient and outpatient care for the zip
codes encompassed in the Atlanta, Georgia specialty care radius for Fiscal Years 2014-
2017 was requested along with TRICARE enrollment and inpatient and outpatient
direct care data from Wright Patterson Air Force Base (WPAFB) for the same fiscal
years due to the specialty care capabilities available at the MTF. WPAFB can conduct
both general surgery and orthopedic procedures which is the main focus for care in the
Atlanta, Georgia market. The data sets from Air Force Medical Operations Agency
were obtained from the Military Health System Data Repository (MDR) and Military
Health System Management Analysis and Reporting Tool (M2) query tool.
MDR and M2
MDR and M2 are the most commonly used systems operated by TRICARE. The
MDR is a centralized data warehouse that captures, archives, validates, integrates,
and distributes the most complete collection of data about beneficiaries of the Military
Health System and their health care. MDR receives data from the Department of
Defense’s (DoD’s) worldwide network of medical facilities and from non-DoD, out-
of-network, health care facilities. MDR operates in a secure SAS-based computing
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environment and is maintained by for expert programmers and analysts. The MDR
contains historical raw and processed records on all health care events paid for by
the Military Health System, regardless of setting. It also contains robust direct and
purchased care data, MTF accounting data, beneficiary data, clinical data, staffing
data, and many other data files. Information in the MDR is accessible as statistical
analysis system datasets.
Most of the data available in the MDR is also available in M2 in a more accessible
form. M2 is a powerful ad hoc query tool used to manage and oversee operations
across the Military Health System [3]. M2 offers a quick and economical way to
access large amounts of data and export the data to other software for more detailed
analysis [3]. This system is especially beneficial to the Defense Health Agency for it
provides proactive health care management, monitors patients’ use of services, and
supports strategic health care planning and the delivery of quality health care at an
affordable cost, while improving medical readiness. M2 delivers summary and detailed
clinical, population, and financial data. The clinical data includes information on both
direct and purchased inpatient care, outpatient care, pharmacy services, and ancillary
services. The financial data includes summary expense and manpower information
from the Medical Expense and Performance Reporting System. The Medical Expense
and Performance Reporting System is the standard cost accounting system for the
Military Health System, containing financial, personnel, and summary workload data
from reporting MTFs.
Enrollment Data
Air Force Medical Operations Agency provided the TRICARE enrollment eligi-
bility data for WPAFB and the Atlanta, Georgia region. To extract the WPAFB
enrollment data from the MDR the Defense Medical Information System Identifier
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for the WPAFB MTF. There is no Defense Medical Information System Identifier if a
MTF does not exist, therefore the list of zip codes encompassed in the isoline radius
was used to capture the enrollment data for Atlanta, Georgia. Within the datasets,
one record exists on an individual registered in the Defense Enrollment Eligibility
Reporting System per month. Included in the WPAFB dataset were nearly half a
million observations from October, 2013 to September, 2017. In the Atlanta, Georgia
dataset were over one million observations from October, 2013 to March, 2016. For a
single observation the age, beneficiary category, zip code, and Alternate Care Value
(ACV) group of the individual was recorded. The beneficiary category is a numeric
value from one to four, each number denoting a subset of the population. Table 1 out-
lines the different beneficiary categories and the population they represent. The ACV
group characterizes the individual based on program enrollments such as TRICARE
Prime, TRICARE Plus, Reliant, and other.
Table 1. TRICARE Beneficiary Categories
Category 1 Dependents of Active Duty or Guard/Reserve on Active Duty
Category 2 Retired
Category 3 All Others
Category 4 Active Duty and Guard/Reserve on Active Duty
Workload Measures
Workload measures were developed as a basis for physician reimbursement and are
pertinent to account for the relative resource intensity across different procedures. For
example, a well patient visit is assigned a smaller workload value than an invasive
surgery. To measure outpatient resource intensity, distinct Relative Value Unit (RVU)
values are recorded for each medical, surgical, and diagnostic service included in the
Current Procedural Terminology code set. This analysis used the Provider Aggregate
Total RVU for direct care outpatient data records. A Provider Aggregate Total
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RVU is the sum of two components: a Work RVU and a Practice Expense RVU.
The Work RVU accounts for the time, technical skill, and intensity required by a
physician to perform a particular service. The Practice Expense RVU accounts for
the physician’s office expenses, staff, and administrative overhead. For purchased
care outpatient data records we use the Enhanced Total RVU, which is comprised
of the same components as the Provider Aggregate Total RVU. A similar concept to
RVUs are Ambulatory Payment Classifications (APCs). An APC is recorded for a
patient who receives outpatient surgery, outpatient clinic care, emergency department
services, or observation services. APCs are not recorded for purchased care claim data.
While RVUs and APCs apply to outpatient care, the Relative Weighted Product
(RWP) and bed days workload measures exist for inpatient services. RWPs are
based on non-mental health Medicare Severity Diagnosis-Related Group codes and
the relative complexity of services and resources utilized. In this analysis, bed days
are used to calculate costs when a RWP value is not recorded. RWPs and bed days are
included in both direct and purchased care datasets. This research used the bed day
measure for the Atlanta purchased care dataset, where 169 out of 13,094 observations
used the bed day value multiplier to find workload costs.
The Prospective Payment System values were used as a multiplier to determine a
dollar value associated with the RVU, APC, RWP, and bed day workload measures.
The Prospective Payment System rates were developed by the Military Health Sys-
tem and are based on Fiscal Year. The Air Force Medical Service uses Prospective
Payment System rates for all calculations. The values are provided in Table 2, where
FY denotes Fiscal Year.
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Table 2. Prospective Payment System Values
Measure FY14 FY15 FY16 FY17
RWP $8,849 $8,930 $9,159 $9,082
Bed Day $887 $915 $925 $955
APC $72.672 $74.271 $75.552 $74.909
RVU $35.823 $35.823 $35.934 $35.889
WPAFB Direct Care Data
The WPAFB direct care data consisted of two different datasets: the Standard
Inpatient Data Record (SIDR) and the Comprehensive Ambulatory Provider En-
counter Record (CAPER). The datasets include beneficiary data, coverage informa-
tion, service-related information, and demographics for each observation. Within the
SIDR dataset, the focus was on the following information for each observation: the
Medicare Severity Diagnosis-Related Group RWP value, ACV group, age, beneficiary
category, pseudo person identifier, Medicare Severity Diagnosis-Related Group code,
admission and discharge dates, and the Medical Expense and Performance Reporting
System dispositioning description. The Medical Expense and Performance Reporting
System dispositioning description is used to determine the product line the patient
received care from, either general surgery or orthopedic. The SIDR dataset includes
nearly 2500 observations from Fiscal Years 2014-2017.
The CAPER dataset contains over 750,000 outpatient care observations from the
same Fiscal Years. The data examined in this set includes similar descriptive identi-
fiers to the SIDR dataset such as the ACV group, age, beneficiary category, pseudo
person identifier, and product line. However, instead of RWPs, CAPER includes the
Provider Aggregate Work, Practice Expense, and Total RVU as well as the APC
aggregate weight if one exists.
33
Atlanta Purchased Care Data
Similar to the WPAFB care data, the Atlanta, Georgia purchased care data is
separated into an inpatient and an outpatient care dataset for Fiscal Years 2014-2017.
Inpatient care is recorded under TRICARE Encounter Data Institutional (TEDI)
and outpatient care under TRICARE Encounter Data Non-Institutional (TEDNI). A
single TEDI observation includes the same information as the WPAFB SIDR data set
except there is no Medical Expense and Performance Reporting System dispositioning
description. The TEDNI outpatient data is analogous to the WPAFB CAPER data
except there is no APC weight. Additionally, there is no product line identifier,
instead there is the service nature. The service nature is a code indicating the clinical
nature of the type of service.
Data Cleaning
Since the Atlanta, Georgia purchased care data does not have any product lines
attached to care, it was necessary to assign an appropriate type of care to each obser-
vation. The VBA code in Appendix A assigned all observations a type of care based
on Medicare Severity Diagnosis-Related Group. The inpatient TEDI observations,
required a list of Medicare Severity Diagnosis-Related Group codes performed at the
WPAFB MTF. It is assumed that any procedure performed at the WPAFB MTF
can be performed at an MTF or clinic developed in Atlanta, Georgia. The Medi-
care Severity Diagnosis-Related Group codes were matched to types of care, either
general surgery, orthopedics, or not performed at an MTF. If the Medicare Severity
Diagnosis-Related Group was listed under both the general surgery and orthopedic
product lines, the Medicare Severity Diagnosis-Related Group was assigned to the
product line with the most number of occurrences. There were two ties where there
were the same number of occurrences between product lines so we assigned one to gen-
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eral surgery and the other to orthopedics. There were only 22 out of 246 Medicare
Severity Diagnosis-Related Group codes performed at an MTF that had observa-
tions with both general surgery and orthopedics. If the Medicare Severity Diagnosis-
Related Group code was not performed at WPAFB, it was assumed it could not be
performed at a potential MTF in Atlanta and was designated as not performed at an
MTF. For example, in the TEDI there was an observation for a Medicare Severity
Diagnosis-Related Group code one. This Medicare Severity Diagnosis-Related Group
represents a heart transplant or implant of heart assist system with major complica-
tions or comorbidity. Realistically, an MTF would not perform this procedure and
the care would be purchased. This happened for 3108 out of 13091 observations.
The same process could not assign product lines to the TEDNI observations be-
cause TEDNI data did not include Medicare Severity Diagnosis-Related Group codes.
The WPAFB CAPER data was used to determine the percentages of general surgery
and orthopedic observations for each year. It was assumed the Atlanta purchased
care outpatient data would follow the same percentages as the WPAFB CAPER
data. Therefore, the TEDNI observations were randomly assigned to either the gen-
eral surgery or orthopedics product line based on the percentages per year observed
in the CAPER data.
Additionally, the Air Force Medical Operations Agency indicated that both At-
lanta based purchased care data and WPAFB direct care data may have duplicate
entries for inpatient and outpatient encounters. Therefore, the VBA code in Appendix
B was used to identify these duplicate entries and mark them for removal. Detecting
duplicates in the purchased care data sets utilized the pseudo person identifier and
begin date of care. There were 9,911 duplicate observations removed from the TEDNI
set. The duplicate entries in the direct care data sets were identified through VBA
code in Appendix C. This code found duplicates based on the pseudo identifier of the
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patient as well as the month and year the care was received. One CAPER entry per
duplicate SIDR observation was removed, a total of 2,284 observations.
The WPAFB direct care CAPER data set included both RVU and APC values.
However, APC values are not recorded for the Atlanta purchased care TEDNI. APC
values for the Atlanta purchased care data are needed for proper workload cost com-
parisons. An initial attempt was to determine if the care should be RVU or APC
based on the service nature. However, this procedure did not produce values con-
sistent with direct care APCs. Therefore, APC values were assigned based on a
multiplier determined from the cost ratio of purchased to direct care for an individ-
ual. The multiplier values are listed as part of the sensitivity analysis in the next
chapter.
Lastly, to ensure clean datasets 569 general surgery and 6,984 orthopedic outpa-
tient WPAFB CAPER encounters were removed. From the Atlanta TEDNI set, 3,574
general surgery and 17,540 orthopedic encounters were removed. These observations
were removed because they did not contain any workload data.
3.3 Monte Carlo Simulation
A simulation is the imitation of the operation of a real-world process or system over
time [26]. A Monte Carlo simulation is used to draw insights on the cost of direct
and purchased medical care. Monte Carlo simulations use stochastic methods to
generate a partial sequence of independent and identically distributed random vectors
X1, X2, ..., Xn having the mass function P {X = xj} , j > 1 [27]. The Monte Carlo
simulations’ repeated random sampling helps obtain numerical results and measures
of the risk involved.
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3.4 Model Overview
Modeling began with differing types of care data that were filtered and aggregated
into manageable inputs for use within the simulation. These data were utilized to to
define 13 different types of care considered in the simulation. Table 3 depicts how
these types of care are abbreviated for future use in the research. Abbreviations are
consistent between direct and purchased care descriptions.
Table 3. Abbreviations Corresponding to Each Type of Care
Type of Care Abbreviation
Orthopedic Inpatient RWP Ortho Inpat
Orthopedic Outpatient APC Ortho Outpat APC
Orthopedic Outpatient RVU Ortho Outpat RVU
General Surgery Inpatient RWP GS Inpat
General Surgery Outpatient APC GS Outpat APC
General Surgery Outpatient RVU GS Outpat RVU
Not Performed at MTF Inpatient RWP Not Inpat
The data are assumed to follow the lognormal distribution for all 13 different
types of care. The lognormal is a continuous heavy-tailed probability distribution
closely related to the normal distribution, but the random variable, X, assumes only
positive values. A random variable X has a lognormal distribution if its probability
distribution (pdf) is
f(x) =

1√
2πσx
exp
[
− (lnx−µ)
2
2σ2
]
, x > 0
0, otherwise
(2)
where σ2 > 0, µ represents the mean also referred to as the shape parameter and σ
represents the standard deviation also referred to as the scale parameter.
JMP version 13.2.1 software fit an appropriate lognormal distribution to each of the
four beneficiary categories in each of the 13 different types of care. An example of the
JMP distribution output is depicted in Figure 2, where the lognormal distribution
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was fit for purchased general surgery inpatient beneficiary category one care. The
lognormal distribution passes the Kolmogorov-Smirnov goodness of fit test. This
distribution fitting process was executed for all types of care.
Figure 2. Lognormal Distribution for GS Inpat Category One Purchased Care
Table 4 illustrates the shape and scale parameters for the fitted lognormal distri-
bution corresponding to the beneficiary category of each type of purchased care. The
same information is displayed in Table 5 for all direct care types.
Table 4. Purchased Care Shape and Scale Parameters by Beneficiary Category
Category 1 Category 2 Category 3 Category 4
Ortho Inpat 9.86725, 0.52469 9.88231, 0.30996 9.88459, 0.33826 9.9502, 0.45105
Ortho Outpat RVU 4.34233, 0.89434 4.37281, 0.86421 4.34373, 0.83395 4.4364, 0.94266
GS Inpat 9.3145, 0.57385 9.45545, 0.62449 9.42344, 0.59444 9.39466, 0.56815
GS Outpat RVU 4.33131, 0.86087 4.36641, 0.8632 4.34458, 0.83767 4.44586, 0.95534
Not Inpat 9.72423, 0.97396 9.90292, 0.83585 9.77159, 0.83126 9.83745, 0.93407
Table 5. Direct Care Shape and Scale Parameters by Beneficiary Category
Category 1 Category 2 Category 3 Category 4
Ortho Inpat 9.60803, 0.74272 9.83415, 0.34022 9.84964, 0.40579 9.79745, 0.48876
Ortho Outpat APC 7.49313, 1.26527 7.85051, 0.84838 7.69484, 1.04419 7.94337, 0.84209
Ortho Outpat RVU 4.07712, 0.62307 4.34604, 0.75236 4.2969, 0.77875 4.15058, 0.64265
GS Inpat 8.9785, 0.53722 9.16386, 0.59317 9.18937, 0.52972 9.08362, 0.48164
GS Outpat APC 7.71237, 0.59781 7.58402, 0.67191 7.60138, 0.65159 7.71805, 0.63205
GS Outpat RVU 4.57125, 0.70754 4.60267, 0.7786 4.63426, 0.84802 4.61788, 0.71395
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Cumulative distribution functions (cdfs) were created from each unique pdf for
all types of care and beneficiary category. The cdfs were developed to find the total
cost of care for a particular care type partitioned by the costs for each beneficiary
category. These cdfs were used to find the overall cost of purchased or direct care for
a specific enrollment. An example cdf is displayed in Table 6 for purchased general
surgery inpatient care.
The Monte Carlo simulation was tested using the VBA code in Appendix D. To
start a U(0,1) random variable was generated. This indicated the beneficiary category
in the cdf from which the corresponding pdf was used to generate a cost. For example,
using the cdf in Table 6, if the random number was 0.5 then the random entity would
follow the pdf from category three. A second random number in the LOGNORM.INV
function in Excel, along with the pdf parameters, produced a cost. The distribution
parameters provided by JMP’s distributions tool conveniently match the format of
Excel’s LOGNORM.INV function. JMP produces the shape parameter, which is
equivalent to the mean, µ, and the scale parameter, which is equivalent to the standard
deviation, σ. Therefore, a single entity moving through the simulation will first be
assigned a random number. Depending on where that random number falls, the cost
for care is generated from the appropriate cost distribution.
Table 6. Purchased Care GS Inpat CDF
Category 1 Category 2 Category 3 Category 4
0.073597 0.463661 0.953082 1
This procedure was used to generate costs for 100,000 entities moving through the
system. This number of entities yields a very small standard error of the mean. The
standard error of the mean is not based on the assumption of a normally distributed
population, therefore it is applicable for the lognormally distributed population. The
standard error of the mean is calculated by
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σx =
σ√
n
, (3)
where σ is the standard deviation of the population and n is the number of observa-
tions of the sample. Running this simulation for a higher number of entities would
consume additional time for no additional benefit. Additionally, we ran one replica-
tion occurs for each instance because all factors are assumed to be independent, thus
making any additional runs futile.
A count of the number of entities is maintained for each category. Using this count
yields cost margins for an individual for each type of care in the simulation. The mean
cost of a particular care type j, noted Xj, is calculated using
Xj =
1
n
n∑
i=1
Xij, (4)
where Xij represents the i
th value of the sample and n represented the sample size.
The various individual costs for a given care type are evaluated in the following
chapter.
Determining the costs for an individual in a given beneficiary category and care
helped to develop two scenarios. The first scenario determines the costs of providing
both direct and purchased care at WPAFB’s historical number of encounters for each
category over three years. This scenario is called the WPAFB enrollment in the next
chapter. The second scenario, referred to as Atlanta enrollment, determines the same
costs, but at predicted Atlanta encounter numbers for three years for each care and
beneficiary category. Atlanta encounter numbers were predicted based on the ratio
of each beneficiary category’s enrollment to WPAFB.
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3.5 Verification and Validation
Verification and validation are separate procedures that are essential to ensure
the credibility and accuracy of any information and analyses in a simulation model.
Verification is concerned with assuring the model is built correctly and behaves as
intended. Validation is concerned with building the correct model and ensuring the
model behaves the same as the real system.
For this research to ensure model adequacy, the model was verified by extending
the parameters to extreme values and monitoring how the simulation responded.
The means of each distribution were increased by 10 and the resulting mean cost
per beneficiary category observed. For example, consider changing the mean of the
pdf for the purchased general surgery inpatient beneficiary category one care. After
running the simulation, the individual cost of care increased by a magnitude of four.
A separate instance varied the standard deviations in each pdf and monitored the
behavior of the simulation. Again, the Monte Carlo simulation produced differing
cost results. Since the differing cost results when varying the two parameters is
expected, there is confidence the model is correctly built.
Model Validation involved setting aside one fiscal year of data. Fiscal Year 2014 is
the validation set because there were no significant policy changes influencing the way
military health care is delivered or any considerable changes to military authorization
numbers. Results with this validation dataset led to concluding there are no factors
that may affect the behavior of the data. The validation dataset followed the same
process to determine the applicable distribution. The shape and scale parameters
for the Fiscal Year 2014 lognormal distributions for purchased and direct care are
displayed in Appendix E. The dataset ran through the same Monte Carlo simulations,
adjusting for the different pdfs. Due to the stochasticity of the simulation process an
exact match is unlikely, however similar cost results are expected. Figure 3 displays
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the commonalities between the purchased care orthopedic outpatient RVU values
from the test and validation datasets.
Figure 3. Cost Comparison Between the Test and Validation Data
3.6 Summary
This chapter outlined the methodology for developing a deterministic cost model
used to compare the workload costs of providing health care at a MTF versus in
the private sector. the chapter first described the process to determine the radius
of TRICARE enrolled individuals in the Atlanta, Georgia region. Next, it described
where the data came from as well as the specific enrollment data received. It then
discussed the workload measures used in the analysis and the nature of the direct
and purchased care datasets. The procedures used to produce clean and comparable
datasets for the Monte Carlo simulation were outlined. Finally, the Monte Carlo
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simulation model and the steps performed to verify and validate the model were
presented. The analysis and results of this applied methodology are discussed in the
next chapter.
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IV. Analysis
4.1 Overview
In this analysis section, the research methodology is used to represent the costs
to provide direct and purchased medical care based on workload measures. Dsts
between direct and purchased care for the general surgery and orthopedics specialties
are discussed. Sensitivity analysis on the fiscal impacts of developing a new military
treatment facility (MTF) in Atlanta, Georgia to the Department of Defense (DoD)
are also discussed. Finally, results are summarized in terms of their application to
the original problem statement that motivated the research.
4.2 Analysis
The Monte Carlo simulation first determines the cost for an individual in any
given type of care and beneficiary category. The individual cost results are displayed
in Table 7 for direct care costs and Table 8 for purchased care costs.
Table 7. Direct Care Individual Cost
Category 1 Category 2 Category 3 Category 4
GS Outpat APC $2,661.04 $2,467.47 $2,474.37 $2,757.94
GS Outpat RVU $121.98 $134.89 $146.71 $130.84
GS Inpat $9,113.26 $11,437.09 $11,249.17 $9,848.66
Ortho Outpat APC $4,009.56 $3,684.05 $3,784.99 $3,972.64
Ortho Outpat RVU $71.81 $102.76 $99.81 $77.79
Ortho Inpat $19,420.26 $19,770.56 $20,524.23 $20,240.68
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Table 8. Purchased Care Individual Cost
Category 1 Category 2 Category 3 Category 4
GS Outpat RVU $110.67 $114.94 $109.13 $135.82
GS Inpat $13,136.33 $15,610.66 $14,723.30 $14,158.93
Ortho Outpat RVU $115.78 $115.13 $108.73 $132.19
Ortho Inpat $22,258.26 $20,534.62 $20,780.57 $23,315.89
Not Inpat $27,038.21 $28,304 $24,961.59 $28,856.85
Results do not define the general surgery or orthopedics outpatient Ambulatory
Payment Classification (APC) individual cost values for purchased care. These out-
patient APC costs are considered uncertain parameters. Estimating APC cost values
in the sensitivity analysis allows a full comparison between direct and purchased mil-
itary health care. These individual costs, along with the number of encounters, were
used to calculate the costs of direct and purchased care for each of the scenarios.
The number of encounters over a three year time period for each type of care and
beneficiary category in the Wright Patterson Air Force Base (WPAFB) enrollment
scenario are displayed in Table 9.
Table 9. Encounters for WPAFB Enrollment Scenario
Category 1 Category 2 Category 3 Category 4
GS Outpat APC 196 748 684 220
GS Outpat RVU 895 2,787 3,486 1,059
GS Inpat 62 222 339 82
Ortho Outpat APC 184 508 723 611
Ortho Outpat RVU 3,531 11,598 15,462 8,441
Ortho Inpat 22 338 509 100
The enrollment datasets from WPAFB and the new Atlanta market were used to
calculate a ratio of enrollment for each beneficiary category between the two regions.
These ratios were then used to determine the number of encounters for each type
of care and beneficiary category in the Atlanta enrollment scenario. The predicted
encounter values for the Atlanta enrollment scenario are displayed in Table 10.
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Table 10. Predicted Encounters for Atlanta Enrollment Scenario
Category 1 Category 2 Category 3 Category 4
GS Outpat APC 432 1,034 1,353 688
GS Outpat RVU 1,972 3,854 6,896 3,311
GS Inpat 137 307 671 256
Ortho Outpat APC 405 703 1,430 1,910
Ortho Outpat RVU 7,778 16,039 30,588 26,389
Ortho Inpat 48 467 1,007 313
4.3 Sensitivity Analysis
Sensitivity analysis was conducted on uncertain parameters to monitor the perfor-
mance of the results. The uncertain parameters for both scenarios are the individual
APC cost values for general surgery and orthopedic purchased care. To obtain a
cost value for the uncertain parameters, first calculate the cost ratios between direct
and purchased outpatient Relative Value Unit (RVU) care. Then, assign a ratio to
the outpatient purchased care APC values using the known outpatient RVU ratios.
Multiply this ratio by the cost of direct outpatient APC care for each beneficiary cat-
egories in the two specialties. For example, the general surgery outpatient RVU ratio
for beneficiary category one is 0.91. Multiply this ratio by $2,661.04, which is the cost
for a beneficiary category one individual to receive general surgery outpatient APC
direct care. This resulted in an estimated purchased care general surgery outpatient
APC cost value of $2,414.35. For the sensitivity analysis, consider a range of RVU
ratios from -0.3 to +0.3 in increments of 0.1 and apply these incremented ratios to all
beneficiary categories. Table 11 displays the increments and the corresponding total
APC cost for the general surgery and orthopedic care types for the WPAFB enroll-
ment scenario. Table 12 displays the same information for the Atlanta enrollment
scenario.
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Table 11. WPAFB Enrollment Sensitivity Analysis On Unknown Purchased Care APC
Parameters
Increment General Surgery Total APC Cost Orthopedic Total APC Cost
-0.3 $2,534,613.26 $8,059,945.18
-0.2 $3,001,258.02 $8,837,253.93
-0.1 $3,467,902.79 $9,614,562.68
0 $3,934,547.56 $10,391,871.43
+0.1 $4,401,192.32 $11,169,180.18
+0.2 $4,867,837.09 $11,946,488.93
+0.3 $5,334,481.86 $12,723,797.68
Table 12. Atlanta Enrollment Sensitivity Analysis on Unknown Purchased Care APC
Parameters
Increment General Surgery Total APC Cost Orthopedic Total APC Cost
-0.3 $4,992,709.21 $19,147,245.21
-0.2 $5,887,339.49 $20,868,773.13
-0.1 $6,781,969.77 $22,590,301.04
0 $7,676,600.04 $24,311,828.96
+0.1 $8,571,230.32 $26,033,356.87
+0.2 $9,465,860.60 $27,754,884.78
+0.3 $10,360,490.88 $29,476,412.70
Table 11 and Table 12 results show that the costs increase in a linear fashion
for both general surgery and orthopedics as the increment increases. Additionally,
the costs in Table 12 are almost twice as high as those costs in Table 11 because
the enrollment is higher for the Atlanta market for all beneficiary categories. The
enrollment in Atlanta is 2.2, 1.38, 1.98, and 3.13 times higher than WPAFB for
beneficiary category one, two, three, and four respectively.
The sensitivity analysis helped determine that the total value of purchased care
ranges from $46.85 to $71.72 million for the WPAFB enrollment scenario. For the
Atlanta enrollment scenario, there is a higher range of values, from $94.55 to $142.99
million. Comparatively, for direct care the cost to operate under the WPAFB enroll-
ment scenario is $44.53 and $87.19 million for the Atlanta enrollment scenario. The
comparison between these purchased and direct care costs can be observed in Figure
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4 for WPAFB Enrollment scenario and Figure 5 for the Atlanta enrollment scenario.
Figure 4 and Figure 5 represent the range of total purchased care costs with the gray
shaded area of the stacked column.
Figure 4. WPAFB Enrollment Cost Comparison Between Direct and Purchased Care
Figure 5. Atlanta Enrollment Cost Comparison Between Direct and Purchased Care
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4.4 Summary
This chapter presents the analysis used to help Air Force Medical Operations
Agency gain insights on the value of direct and purchased military health care and
the need for a new MTF in Atlanta, Georgia. The analysis indicates that providing
direct care is always cheaper than providing purchased care except for general surgery
outpatient procedures for all beneficiaries except active duty service members.
For direct care the cost to provide care for three years under the WPAFB enroll-
ment scenario is about $44.53 and $87.19 million for the Atlanta enrollment scenario.
To provide the same purchased care under the WPAFB enrollment scenario would
cost anywhere from $2.33 to $27.2 million more than if it were performed at a direct
care facility. For the Atlanta enrollment scenario, the purchased care is $7.36 to $55.8
million more expensive than the same direct care.
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V. Conclusions and Future Research
5.1 Overview
This final chapter presents the conclusions, the limitations, and future areas of
research.
5.2 Conclusions
The comparatively high enrollment numbers for the Atlanta, Georgia region com-
bined with the discounted costs to provide direct care warrant the consideration of
developing a new military treatment facility (MTF) in the region. The analysis indi-
cates that the enrollment in Atlanta is higher than Wright Patterson Air Force Base
for all four beneficiary categories. This result indicates that there is enough demand
in the region to justify the development of a new MTF. Additionally, the analysis
focused specifically on workload costs, which closely follow the lognormal distribu-
tion. Based on workload measures, it is cheaper to deliver both general surgery and
orthopedic care at a MTF. A new MTF in Atlanta, Georgia would better ensure
operational readiness by providing an additional site for clinicians to train. However,
one cannot determine the effects to medical readiness.
The Air Force Medical Service and Air Force Medical Operations Agency should
consider developing a new MTF in the Atlanta, Georgia region in order to reduce
health care costs to the Department of Defense. The methodology applied in this
research to the Atlanta region can be applied to any geographical region to determine
the possibility of reduced costs. The development of additional MTFs, combined
with other efforts aimed at achieving savings and efficiencies within the operational
environment of the Military Health System, can help the Department of Defense
control the rising costs of military health care. The Department of Defense must also
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continue to pursue reasonable health benefit reform as part of a balanced approach.
5.3 Limitations
The model developed in this work considered the costs of direct and purchased mil-
itary medical health care based on workload measures. The model did not consider
any fixed startup costs, nor any annual costs such as clinicians salaries or building
operational costs. Additionally, the model does not capture the potential compensa-
tion a MTF would receive from other health insurance. Reimbursement from other
health insurance would reduce the costs of providing direct care at a MTF.
The scope of this research was limited to general surgery and orthopedic specialties.
However, the methodology in this research can be applied to all specialty and primary
care types. Additionally, the workload measures for a type of care are calculated based
on beneficiary categories. The work does not consider other identifying characteristics
such as age or Alternate Care Value group. The TRICARE program was restructured
beginning in January of 2018. Therefore, any information gained from the Alternate
Care Value group identifier may be obsolete for the updated structure. Additionally,
the model does not account for any drastic changes in the cost to deliver direct or
purchased health care.
The work assumes that if a MTF were developed the MTF would experience
enough encounters to be fiscally beneficial and will operate at a similar efficiency
as Wright Patterson Air Force Base. This research cannot predict the future MTF
efficiency or performance. These outcomes are often based on how well the MTF
leader manages care. Additionally, for a fair comparison between direct and pur-
chased care, malpractice expenses are not incorporated into the calculations. The
Malpractice Expense Relative Value Unit represents the cost of liability insurance for
a provider. Malpractice Expense Relative Value Units are recorded only for purchased
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care. There are no Malpractice Expenses recorded for direct care because military
clinicians are protected from medical malpractice lawsuits.
Medical teams are assumed to treat a minimum number of patients and meet the
operational readiness mission. It is assumed MTF clinicians will maintain adequate
training to care for personnel in both peace and war time and the medical teams at
a MTF will have the availability and capability to keep a medically ready force and
meet the medical readiness mission.
5.4 Future Research
This analysis assists Air Force Medical Service and Air Force Medical Operations
Agency in deciding if a new MTF in the Atlanta, Georgia region will help reduce
military health care costs to the Department of Defense. However, in order to make
an informed decision, the Air Force Medical Operations Agency should consider future
research into the problem. Future work might consider a full cost analysis, to include
fixed and variable costs, on each of the two alternatives. Additionally, future research
might examine methods to reduce costs through different building options. Instead
of the DoD constructing and staffing their own facility, it may be beneficial to lease
or rent the space.
This analysis provides a means to examine primary care and other care specialties.
Extensions might consider the age group and other characteristics to see if there is a
statistically significant difference in the cost of care. The analysis provides insights
on the cost of care based on beneficiary categories. Those individuals in beneficiary
category four must be seen at an MTF unless there is a referral. However, all other
beneficiary categories are not required to receive care at an MTF. Therefore, future
research could examine the potential to recapture care. Recapture care here means to
determine the number of beneficiaries who will switch from private sector care and in-
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stead choose to receive care at a MTF. Future researchers should know the population,
understand the services, and leverage medical informatics to provide a comprehensive
recommendation on the development of a new MTF in any geographical area.
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Appendix A. Inpatient Product Line VBA Code
Sub MeprsCode()
Dim Count As Double
Dim i As Double
Dim DataRange As Range
Dim TEDi As Worksheet
Dim MsDrg As Double
Dim MeprsID As String
Set TEDi = Sheets("TEDI")
Set DataRange = Range(TEDi.Cells(2, 1), TEDi.Cells(2, 1).End(xlDown))
Count = WorksheetFunction.Count(DataRange)
i = 2
MsDrg = TEDi.Range("R" & i).Value
For i = 2 To Count + 1
Select Case MsDrg
Case 29, 30, 42, 81, 162, 169, 305, 454, 455, 457, 458, 459,
460, 462, 464, 465, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 481, 482,
483, 484, 486, 488, 489, 490, 491, 493, 494, 496, 497, 504, 511,
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512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 536, 554, 556, 558,
560, 561, 563, 566, 572, 857, 858, 902, 903, 906, 909, 940, 951,
982, 983, 987
MeprsID = "ORTHOPEDICS"
TEDi.Range("S" & i).Value = MeprsID
Case 27, 132, 133, 134, 145, 148, 149, 151, 156, 167, 170, 184,
185, 186, 198, 200, 201, 204, 206, 225, 227, 244, 264, 300, 301,
309, 310, 312, 313, 315, 316, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 333,
335, 336, 337, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 348, 349,
351, 352, 354, 355, 357, 358, 370, 371, 372, 373, 375, 376, 379,
381, 384, 385, 386, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 409,
414, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 434, 439, 440, 443, 444, 445,
446, 459, 460, 464, 467, 468, 470, 473, 481, 482, 488, 489, 490,
491, 492, 493, 494, 502, 544, 552, 570, 571, 576, 578, 580, 581,
582, 583, 585, 599, 601, 603, 614, 626, 627, 640, 641, 655, 660,
661, 663, 682, 683, 690, 694, 696, 699, 700, 708, 709, 710, 713,
714, 734, 735, 736, 742, 743, 748, 749, 769, 775, 776, 781, 799,
801, 804, 812, 821, 825, 827, 828, 856, 862, 863, 864, 871, 880,
908, 920, 921, 947, 948, 949, 950, 963, 981, 988, 989
MeprsID = "GENERAL SURGERY"
TEDi.Range("S" & i).Value = MeprsID
Case Else
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MeprsID = "Not Performed at MTF"
TEDi.Range("S" & i).Value = MeprsID
End Select
MsDrg = TEDi.Range("R" & i + 1).Value
Next
End Sub
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Appendix B. Purchased Care Duplicates VBA Code
Sub FindDuplicates()
Dim Inpat As Worksheet
Dim Outpat As Worksheet
Dim Dup As Worksheet
Dim InID As String
Dim InCM As Double
Dim InCY As Double
Dim OutID As String
Dim OutCM As Double
Dim OutCY As Double
Dim InCount As Double
Dim OutCount As Double
Dim InDataRange As Range
Dim OutDataRange As Range
Dim i As Double
Dim n As Double
Dim LastRow As Double
Set Inpat = Sheets("Inpat")
Set Outpat = Sheets("Outpat")
Set Dup = Sheets("Duplicates")
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Set InDataRange = Range(Inpat.Cells(2, 1), Inpat.Cells(2, 1).End(xlDown))
InCount = WorksheetFunction.Count(InDataRange)
Set OutDataRange = Range(Outpat.Cells(2, 1), Outpat.Cells(2, 1).End(xlDown))
OutCount = WorksheetFunction.Count(OutDataRange)
For i = 2 To InCount
InID = Inpat.Range("H" & i).Value
InCM = Inpat.Range("M" & i).Value
InCY = Inpat.Range("N" & i).Value
For n = 2 To OutCount
OutID = Outpat.Range("E" & n).Value
OutCM = Outpat.Range("L" & n).Value
OutCY = Outpat.Range("M" & n).Value
If OutID = InID Then
If OutCM = InCM Then
If OutCY = InCY Then
LastRow = Dup.Range("A" & Rows.Count).End(xlUp).Row + 1
Dup.Range("A" & LastRow).Value = OutID
Dup.Range("B" & LastRow).Value = OutCM
Dup.Range("C" & LastRow).Value = OutCY
Dup.Range("D" & LastRow).Value = n
Dup.Range("E" & LastRow).Value = i
Else
n = n
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End If
Else
n = n
End If
Else
n = n
End If
Next n
Next i
End Sub
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Appendix C. Direct Care Duplicates VBA Code
Sub FindDuplicates()
Dim SIDR As Worksheet
Dim CAPER As Worksheet
Dim Dup As Worksheet
Dim SidrID As String
Dim SidrCM As Double
Dim SidrCY As Double
Dim CaperID As String
Dim CaperCM As Double
Dim CaperCY As Double
Dim SidrCount As Double
Dim CaperCount As Double
Dim SidrDataRange As Range
Dim CaperDataRange As Range
Dim i As Double
Dim n As Double
Dim LastRow As Double
Set SIDR = Sheets("WPAFB SIDR")
Set CAPER = Sheets("WPAFB CAPER")
Set Dup = Sheets("Duplicates")
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Set SidrDataRange = Range(SIDR.Cells(2, 1), SIDR.Cells(2, 1).End(xlDown))
SidrCount = WorksheetFunction.Count(SidrDataRange)
Set CaperDataRange = Range(CAPER.Cells(2, 1), CAPER.Cells(2, 1).End(xlDown))
CaperCount = WorksheetFunction.Count(CaperDataRange)
i = 2
SidrID = SIDR.Range("AA" & i).Value
SidrCM = SIDR.Range("H" & i).Value
SidrCY = SIDR.Range("I" & i).Value
n = 2
CaperID = CAPER.Range("Y" & n).Value
CaperCM = CAPER.Range("N" & n).Value
CaperCY = CAPER.Range("O" & n).Value
For i = 2 To SidrCount
For n = 2 To CaperCount
CaperID = CAPER.Range("Y" & n).Value
CaperCM = CAPER.Range("N" & n).Value
CaperCY = CAPER.Range("O" & n).Value
If CaperID = SidrID Then
If CaperCM = SidrCM Then
If CaperCY = SidrCY Then
LastRow = Dup.Range("A" & Rows.Count).End(xlUp).Row + 1
Dup.Range("A" & LastRow).Value = CaperID
61
Dup.Range("B" & LastRow).Value = CaperCM
Dup.Range("C" & LastRow).Value = CaperCY
Dup.Range("D" & LastRow).Value = n
Dup.Range("E" & LastRow).Value = i
CaperID = CAPER.Range("Y" & n + 1).Value
CaperCM = CAPER.Range("N" & n + 1).Value
CaperCY = CAPER.Range("O" & n + 1).Value
Else
CaperID = CAPER.Range("Y" & n + 1).Value
CaperCM = CAPER.Range("N" & n + 1).Value
CaperCY = CAPER.Range("O" & n + 1).Value
End If
Else
CaperID = CAPER.Range("Y" & n + 1).Value
CaperCM = CAPER.Range("N" & n + 1).Value
CaperCY = CAPER.Range("O" & n + 1).Value
End If
Else
CaperID = CAPER.Range("Y" & n + 1).Value
CaperCM = CAPER.Range("N" & n + 1).Value
CaperCY = CAPER.Range("O" & n + 1).Value
End If
Next n
SidrID = SIDR.Range("AA" & i + 1).Value
SidrCM = SIDR.Range("H" & i + 1).Value
SidrCY = SIDR.Range("I" & i + 1).Value
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Next i
End Sub
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Appendix D. Monte Carlo Simulation VBA Code
Sub PC_GS_Inpat()
Dim RndNum As Double
Dim i As Double
Dim Cat1TotalCost As Double
Dim Cat2TotalCost As Double
Dim Cat3TotalCost As Double
Dim Cat4TotalCost As Double
Dim Cost As Double
Dim RndNum2 As Double
Dim n As Double
For n = 1 To 100
For i = 1 To 10000
RndNum = Rnd()
RndNum2 = Rnd()
If RndNum < 0.073598 Then
Cost = WorksheetFunction.LogNorm_Inv(RndNum2, 9.3145, 0.57385)
Cat1TotalCost = Cost + Cat1TotalCost
ElseIf RndNum > 0.073597 And RndNum < 0.463662 Then
Cost = WorksheetFunction.LogNorm_Inv(RndNum2, 9.45545, 0.62449)
Cat2TotalCost = Cost + Cat2TotalCost
64
ElseIf RndNum > 0.463661 And RndNum < 0.953083 Then
Cost = WorksheetFunction.LogNorm_Inv(RndNum2, 9.42344, 0.59444)
Cat3TotalCost = Cost + Cat3TotalCost
Else
Cost = WorksheetFunction.LogNorm_Inv(RndNum2, 9.39466, 0.56815)
Cat4TotalCost = Cost + Cat4TotalCost
End If
Next
Sheets("PC GS Inpat").Range("A" & n + 1).Value = Cat1TotalCost
Sheets("PC GS Inpat").Range("B" & n + 1).Value = Cat2TotalCost
Sheets("PC GS Inpat").Range("C" & n + 1).Value = Cat3TotalCost
Sheets("PC GS Inpat").Range("D" & n + 1).Value = Cat4TotalCost
Cat1TotalCost = 0
Cat2TotalCost = 0
Cat3TotalCost = 0
Cat4TotalCost = 0
Next
End Sub
65
Appendix E. Validation Data Shape and Scale Parameters
Table 13. Purchased Care Shape and Scale Parameters 2014
Category 1 Category 2 Category 3 Category 4
Ortho Inpat 9.68559, 0.58972 9.90679, 0.3493 9.83713, 0.37601 9.98971, 0.482
Ortho Outpat RVU 4.37374, 0.88526 4.38707, 0.85958 4.36266, 0.82562 4.4722, 0.90466
GS Inpat 9.15786, 0.5638 9.42022, 0.6208 9.39767, 0.57853 9.43294, 0.63715
GS Outpat RVU 4.42363, 0.88856 4.39423, 0.84628 4.3858, 0.8271 4.44273, 0.89054
Not Inpat 9.79664, 0.92027 9.90165, 0.74852 9.79533, 0.75479 9.72031, 0.8834
Table 14. Direct Care Shape and Scale Parameters 2014
Category 1 Category 2 Category 3 Category 4
Ortho Inpat 9.51938, 0.89406 9.6907, 0.48509 9.71258, 0.51774 9.61394, 0.62424
Ortho Outpat APC 7.73144, 0.99948 7.67858, 1.06865 7.64591, 1.21098 7.87613, 1.01529
Ortho Outpat RVU 4.075, 0.67155 4.25825, 0.74867 4.19452, 0.74585 4.13659, 0.70468
GS Inpat 9.02343, 0.53522 9.3148, 0.6301 9.25407, 0.59299 9.16513, 0.62883
GS Outpat APC 7.77341, 0.62008 7.3772, 0.79553 7.26369, 0.72937 7.67698, 0.65327
GS Outpat RVU 4.59086, 0.98896 4.62184, 1.04749 4.59685, 0.94779 4.62108, 0.86344
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